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1 Introduction
Rotating savings and credit associations (roscas) are one of the most prevalent forms of in-
formal financial institution in developing countries. The basic principle of roscas is almost
the same everywhere. A group of people gather for a series of meetings. At each meeting,
everybody contributes to a common pot. The pot is given to only one member of the group.
This member is then excluded from receiving the pot at future meetings, but still contributes
towards it. This process is repeated until every member has received the pot. The rosca is
then disbanded or begins another cycle. The pot may be allocated randomly (random roscas),
or through a bidding process (bidding roscas). For random roscas, while the original allocation
order is chosen randomly, the order of the winners may, or may not, be repeated throughout
the cycles.
Roscas are very specific types of agreement. They stipulate a constant contribution to be
paid at regular dates and with an equal lump-sum transfer to be received randomly in the
future. Despite the high degree of specificity of these financial agreements, roscas exist on
at least three continents (Africa, Asia, Latin America) and within very different communities
(Bouman, 1977). They involve between 50% and 95% of the adult population in several African
countries and mobilize about one-half of national savings in Cameroon (Bouman, 1995). The
particular characteristics of roscas thus probably respond in some way to the needs of the
population living in these countries.
The literature has mainly investigated two justifications for the existence of roscas. First,
roscas may be viewed as a substitute to insurance, especially in developing countries where
markets for insurance either do not exist or do not function well. Yet this interpretation
applies only to bidding roscas (e.g. Calomiris and Rajaraman, 1998, Klonner, 2003), in which
the allocation process responds to some individual specific shocks, and not to random roscas.
Moreover, people who group together in a rosca generally belong to the same village and have
similar occupations and income. For instance, Besley, Coate and Loury (1994) mention that
the typical scenario is a group of individuals who work in the same office block or belong to
the same community. This strong homogeneity within roscas is not really consistent with risk
diversification purposes.
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Second, and more importantly, roscas may facilitate the purchase of durable goods. In
their seminal contribution, Besley, Coate and Loury (1993) show that, on average, roscas al-
low individuals to buy the durable good sooner in their lifetime than by accumulating private
savings. This interpretation applies for some random roscas. However, it does not apply for a
common random roscas whereby, after one full cycle, the order of draws is repeated through-
out subsequent cycles. Consequently, the member who receives the pot last could do as well
by privately accumulating savings, while not suffering from the lack of flexibility in terms of
the contribution schedule. This member is thus worse off. By backward induction, the rosca
should break down. Furthermore, Gugerty (2000) found evidence against the durable good
explanation from Western Kenya. She mentions that, in her survey, “over half of roscas partic-
ipants use their rosca winning for more than one purpose, and one fifth use their winning for
more than two purposes.” Many rosca participants also indicate that they do not necessarily
prefer to receive the pot sooner than later.
This paper examines a third justification based on a limited self-control hypothesis. It
argues that the specific characteristics of roscas (constant and low contribution scheduled
in advanced, high remuneration, inflexible and random ordering) help people to cope with
their self-control problems. It relies on a simple model in which roscas emerge as an efficient
financial agreement that people want to commit on.
The model works as follows. Individuals can purchase two types of good: standard goods
(composite consumption) and a “superfluous” good. The superfluous good is subject to a
self-control problem: its consumption yields a non-pecuniary lumpy benefit which has no
anticipated value. It is modelled as time-inconsistent (or temporary) preferences.1 The other
important aspect of this economy is that people are allowed to group together and to sign
binding financial agreements among themselves. By signing a financial agreement, individuals
form a coalition. We focus on stable coalition structures in the precise sense that no group
of individuals has an incentive to deviate by signing another financial agreement. Our main
result is that people in this economy are better-off by forming roscas than by designing any
other kind of financial agreements.
1Temporary preference refers here to an extreme form of time-inconsistency: the consumption of the super-
fluous good induces some strictly positive value only during the consumption period.
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This paper is not the first to introduce the idea of limited self-control as a potential
rationale to explain roscas. Recently, the economic literature has complemented the durable
good motive for forming roscas by suggesting that roscas may also serve as a commitment
device to save (Gugerty, 2000, Aliber, 2001, Anderson and Baland, 2002). This development
has been inspired by at least two factors.
First, an abundant literature in psychology and economics suggests that many individuals
suffer from self-control and time-inconsistency problems (Akerlof, 1991, Ainslie, 1992, Thaler,
1992, O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). Commitment techniques that restrict individuals’ choice
in the future can help to overcome these inconsistencies. It has been observed that many
commitment savings products exist in developing countries (Ashraf et al., 2003). It is natural
to see roscas as a commitment function as well.
Second, some survey studies indicate that rosca members often report self-control problems
as their main reason for joining roscas. For instance, people report that “You can’t save alone-
it is easy to misuse money”, “Sitting with other members helps you to save”, “It is difficult to
keep money at home as demands are high” in Gugerty (2000). In Henry and al. (1990), a rosca
member says that “When one wants to save money, joining a rosca forces one to save a little”
(our translation). In Kuper and Kaplan (1944) (quoted in Aliber, 2001), people comment that
“The contribution is not much, and I would spend it in any case on nothing” ; “Because I
could not save when I was alone the [rosca] helps me to save”. In Aliber (2001), a member
confesses that he ‘feel[s] obliged to pay and therefore benefit in that it is a saving scheme of
some sort”. People seem to have some difficulties in sticking to a consumption plan. They
have a tendency to spend money for purposes other than the ones originally planned.
Self-control problems may be approached at the household level as well. This idea is
formalized in Anderson and Baland (2002). They consider an intra-household bargaining
model. In this model, at a point in time the wife loses the full control of the household’s
expenditures. But she wants to keep some money out of her husband’s control in order to buy
a durable good. Ex ante, she thus may find it useful to belong to a rosca. Even if our model
differs from Anderson and Baland’s, both models argue that a temporal disagreement (among
different “selves” or within a household) explains rosca participation.
In the same vein, self-control problems might be caused by social pressure from relatives
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or community members. People in developing countries are involved in networks of relations
with strong norms and obligations enforced by social pressure. Although we model limited
self-control as a pure individual problem, we contend that social relations and peer-pressure
may be at the origin of self-control problems or exacerbate them. For instance, the desire to
purchase superfluous goods may be triggered by a specific social or economic context. It is
well-known that people tend to purchase some specific goods during social events, e.g., gifts,
alcohol, food. They might enjoy the instantaneous social gratification from doing so, or else
feel guilty if they do not. Typically, in developing countries people are pressed to distribute a
part of their income, to assist their relatives, as an informal taxation system. Anthropological
studies emphasize the importance of such a social norm in traditional societies (see Parkin,
1972, Scott, 1976, James 1979, Platteau, 1996, among others). As argued in Fafchamps (1995),
people suffer from internalized moral sanction when they deviate from this social code and/or
enjoy some rewards when they comply with it. Sanctions and gratifications are thus created
through social pressure within the community. For instance, people may publicly disapprove of
those who accumulate wealth without sharing it within the community (James 1979, Platteau
1996). On the other hand, the community may reward generous donors during social events
in the form of social prestige for instance (see Parkin, 1972, regarding the rules of ceremonies
in which donors are thanked). The act of giving to the community may therefore be a sort
of emotional response to this social pressure,2 and can arguably be viewed as a purchase of a
superfluous good from an ex ante point of view. The main result of the paper could then be
reformulated. A rosca may be useful for people pressed by their relatives to share their income.
The basic idea is that individuals belonging to a rosca commit to contribute a fixed amount
in the future. As a result, participating in a rosca reduces their future available income, and
thus reduces their future vulnerability to social pressure. As Platteau (2000, page 231) put it:
“[Roscas] provide a socially accepted alibi to protect people’s saving against all sorts of social
2Elster (1998, page 70) writes: “The person who sees a beggar in the street and feels an urge to give him
money, or the person who is in the grip of shame and feels an urge to kill himself, may be viewed as undergoing
a short-term change of preferences. It is in fact an important feature of many occurrent emotions that they
have relatively short duration”. If we follow Elster, we should think of these emotions as a form of temporary
preference.
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pressure”.3
Our model yields theoretical predictions that are fairly consistent with several empirical
case studies. First, roscas mostly attract average-income individuals, as apposed to very
poor or very rich. Second, members are homogeneous within roscas. Third, across roscas
the contribution increases with the revenue of members. Fourth, the amount contributed is
inversely related with the size of the rosca.
Our paper is not the first to model the formation of stable informal agreements in develop-
ing countries. Genicot and Ray (2003) examine self-enforcing informal risk-sharing agreements
within that are robust to the deviation of a subgroup of individuals. However, their analysis
of stability is different. Genicot and Ray (2003) examine deviation by subgroups anytime in
a repeated relationship. Here, the financial agreements are binding. We impose stability only
at the initial contracting stage.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Sections 3
and 4 characterize the stable financial agreement in a static framework. Section 5 extends
the analysis to a dynamic framework and shows that roscas are stable financial agreements.
Section 6 relates some implications of our theoretical analysis with empirical evidence from
several case studies. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper. All proofs are presented in the
Appendix.
2 The Model of Limited Self-Control
Consider an economy with an infinity of individuals i ∈ N living for several periods. In each
period, individual i has income yi. He may consume his entire income and the utility of
pure consumption is denoted ui(yi). Every individual i has also the option of buying one
superfluous good per period at a cost mi. This good yields a non-pecuniary lumpy benefit (or
utility) of Si > 0.
3Similarly, Belsey (1995, page 117) highlights that the “anthropological literature makes clear the importance
of social constraints that can make saving unattractive. Certain familial obligations can be difficult to resist, so
that part of any stock of savings may be paid as a transfer.” Also Ashraf et al. (2003) state that “If less cash
is in hand, or savings are not easily accessed, then an individual is more empowered to turn dow requests for
withdrawals or loans from family or peers.”
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We now introduce the self-control problem. We consider a variant version of the “beta-
delta” model leading to the classical time-inconsistency problem. This model was introduced
by Phelps and Pollack (1968) for intergenerational discounting and used by Laibson (1997) for
intra-personal discounting. In period 1, the utility function of individual i writes as follows
ui(yi − I1mi) + I1Si + βu
∑
t=2
δt−1ui(yi − I2mi) + βS
∑
t=2
δt−1ItSi
where It are the discrete choice variables in the model, each of which can assume a value of
either zero or one in each period. Parameter δ is the per period discount factor. Parameters
βu and βS allow for the possibility of non-exponential discounting derived respectively from
the stream of utility and from the stream of consumption of the superfluous good. To simplify,
we assume βu = 1 and βS = 0: we have thus the standard exponential discounting for the
former and an extreme form of hyperbolic discounting for the latter.
Before we proceed further with the model a comment is in order. Notice that, besides this
extreme form of hyperbolic discounting for the superfluous good, we have assumed that the
superfluous good is of fixed size and indivisible, and that at most one unit can be purchased.
Hence the modelling of the superfluous good is quite specific. However, this shall not obscure
the main point that roscas can mitigate self-control problems in general. As we will see, this
form of hyperbolic discounting towards the superfluous good yields a non-concavity the utility
function, which will be instrumental for explaining the willingness to participate in roscas.
Yet, the standard “beta-delta” model may also yield local non-concavities for some utility
functions (e.g., Luttmer and Mariotti, 2004). As a result, roscas can also be shown to be
valuable in the more standard ”beta-delta” model (an example is given in Gugerty, 2000).
In such a model, in each period t, it is optimal for any individual i to buy the superfluous
good if and only if
ui(yi −mi) + Si > ui(yi). (1)
We assume that ui(.) is defined and differentiable on R+. It is also increasing and concave. In
words, poor people attach relatively less value to the superfluous good compared to current
consumption than do richer people.
With our extreme form of hyperbolic discounting, Si has no value from an ex ante point of
view. Viewed from period t−1 and before, it will never be optimal for i to buy the superfluous
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good in period t since:
ui(yi −mi) < ui(yi). (2)
However individual i anticipates that, at time t, it will be optimal for him to buy the super-
fluous good. In other words, we consider time-inconsistent sophisticated individuals. At every
period, the individual cannot resist to buy the good since (1) holds. Yet, he knows this in
advance and wants to be able to resist to it because spending mi is a pure loss from an ex
ante viewpoint.
Note that, under concavity, there exists a unique revenue y
i
that makes an agent indifferent
between spending mi or not:
ui(yi −mi) + Si = ui(yi). (3)
Clearly, y
i
exists and is unique because the marginal gain of renouncing to Si, ui(y)−ui(y−mi),
is decreasing with y. To summarize, for any y ∈ R+, one can define an agent ex ante utility
in each period by:
vi(y) =
 ui(y −mi) if y > yiui(y) if y ≤ yi . (4)
This function is given by the thick line in Figure 1 shown below.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
The downward jump in the ex ante utility function generates a non-concavity. This implies
that people could be better off by randomizing their revenue by playing lotteries. In the next
section, we investigate what kind of lotteries they would like to play.
3 Efficient Lotteries
In this section, we examine the lottery that an individual i would like to play. Let us first
define a lottery.
Definition 1 A lottery Lj = (K, p, Tj) is defined by:4
4Notice that, in this definition, we choose to map the probability measure p on the set of states of nature
rather than directly on the set of transfers.
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• A set of states of nature K = {1, ..., k}.
• A probability measure p on K where p(l) denotes the probability of state l for any l ∈ K.
• A set of transfers Tj = {tlj}l∈K where tlj denotes the transfer assigned in state l.
If individual i accepts lottery Lj , he faces an ex ante utility:
Ui(Lj) =
∑
l∈K
p(l)vi(yi + tlj). (5)
The expected payoff of a lottery is defined by:
xj ≡
∑
l∈K
p(l)tlj . (6)
A lottery with zero expected payoff, i.e. xj = 0, will be referred as “fair”.
An efficient lottery L∗i maximizes i’s expected utility (as defined in 5) for a given expected
payoff xi. In Lemma 1, we characterize the transfers of such an efficient lottery.
Lemma 1 Any efficient lottery assigned to an individual i randomizes between two transfers
t1i = yi − yi and t2i such that
ui(yi −mi + t2i )− ui(yi + t1i )
t2i − t1i
= u′i(yi −mi + t2i ). (7)
A graphical analysis can be useful to understand the intuition leading to Lemma 1. The
expected payoff of an efficient lottery can easily be represented. The outcome of any draw is
an ex post revenue yi + tli which translates into ex ante utility vi(yi + t
l
i). Graphically, it is a
point on vi. A lottery which randomizes between only two states and the associated transfers
t1i and t
2
i defines two points (yi+ t
1
i , vi(yi+ t
1
i )) and (yi + t
2
i , vi(yi+ t
2
i )). The expected utility
of such a lottery is located on the straight line that links those two points, e.g. line g in Figure
2 below.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
The exact location on this line depends of the expected payoff on the lottery. For instance,
with a fair lottery, the expected utility is located at the intersection of g and a vertical axis
starting from yi, labelled h. Finding an efficient fair lottery amounts to finding a straight line
that maximizes the ordinate of the intersection of g and h. This line, denoted g∗, is the set of
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efficient lotteries. It must be the upper straight line that links two points, one in the portion
ui(y) and the other on the portion ui(y −mi) of vi. It therefore goes from (yi, ui(yi)) and is
tangent to the curve ui(y −mi). The tangency condition of g∗ to ui(y −mi), formally (7),
defines t2i or, equivalently y¯i ≡ yi + t2i .
Denoting µ (resp. 1−µ) the probability to pay −t1i (resp. to receive t2i ), an efficient lottery
for individual i, L∗i , yields to individual i an expected payoff
Ui(L∗i ) = µui(yi) + (1− µ)ui(y¯i −mi), (8)
located along the line g∗. In the next section, we show that the stability condition imposes
restrictions on the expected payoffs of lotteries which picks up a single lottery among the set
of efficient lotteries, i.e. the fair one.
4 Stable Financial Agreements
We now turn to the design of financial agreements. As a first step, we restrict our attention
to a static framework. At the beginning of the period, at date 0 say, people may sign financial
agreements. After this contracting stage, an equilibrium structure of financial agreement
emerges in the economy. Then agreements are carried out. Each agent performs transfers as
specified in the contract and then either buys the superfluous good or not, depending on his
remaining wealth.
We need to introduce more definitions. First, let us first formally define what we call a
“financial agreement” (FA). In short, a FA is a contract among a group of agents assigning
payments among them (including random payments). It is assumed binding: people cannot
default (or at infinite cost). The random procedure (if any) and payment structure are freely
chosen by agents so that no restrictions are imposed on the space of contracts. Formally, a
FA is defined as follows.
Definition 2 A financial agreement Cj = (Nj , {Li}i∈Nj ) is defined by:
• A set of agents Nj ⊂ N
• A set of lotteries {Li}i∈Nj = {(Kj , pj , Ti)}i∈Nj with common set of states of nature
Kj = {1, ..., kj} and probability measure pj on Kj.
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• Lotteries are budget-balanced state-by-state: ∑i∈Nj tli = 0 in each state of nature l ∈ Kj.
In words, a financial agreement defines a group of members Nj who perform random
transfers or lotteries {Li}i∈Nj = (Kj , pj , Ti) among themselves, which are budget balanced in
each draw.
Because transfers are budget balanced state-by-state, the expected payoff of lotteries sum-
up to zero within any FA:∑
i∈Nj
xi =
∑
l∈Kj
pj(l)
∑
i∈Nj
tli = 0 (9)
We now turn to our definition of stability. Denote C = {Cj}j∈N a structure of financial
agreements (SFA). It has to be stable in the sense defined below.
Definition 3 A structure of financial agreements C∗ = {C∗j }j∈N = {(N∗j , {L∗i }i∈N∗j )}j∈N is
stable if, no other FA C′j = (T, {L′i}i∈T ) is such that
• Ui(L′i) ≥ Ui(L∗i ) for every i ∈ T .
• Uh(L′h) > Uh(L∗h) for at least one h ∈ T .
A SFA is stable if no group of agent can be better-off by designing another FA. When
it is not the case, this group would deviate and agree on its own FA. Stability is defined in
the sense of the core. A group of agents would “block” a structure of financial agreements if
this group can improve the payoff of its members by deviating and forming its own financial
agreement. To be stable, a structure of financial agreement must not be blocked by any group
of individuals. Notice that stability implies Pareto efficiency but the reverse is not true.5 As a
consequence a stable SFA contains only efficient lotteries. Thus, Lemma 1 which characterizes
efficient lotteries applies. We now examine the implications of stability for these efficient
lotteries.
Lemma 2 A stable SFA includes only efficient and fair lotteries.
5For instance a SFA which includes FAs that yield different expected payoffs to identical agents might be
efficient (according to the Pareto criterium) but not stable: Those whose expected payoffs are the lowest could
be better-off by forming their own FA at the expense of the others.
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Lemma 2 states that no individual subsidizes other people by playing negative-expected-
payoff lotteries. If it was the case, such an individual would be better-off by forming another
FA in which he would play a zero-expected-payoff (i.e. fair) and efficient lottery. Formally,
Lemma 2 imposes the following restriction on the probability distribution µi:
µit
1
i + (1− µi)t2i = 0. (10)
We have established that the highest payoff that any arbitrary agent can achieve in a stable
structure of FAs is:
Ui(L∗i ) = µiui(yi + t1i ) + (1− µi)ui(yi −mi + t2i ), (11)
where t1i , t
2
i and µi are, respectively, defined by Lemma 1 and by (10). This payoff can be
achieved if i forms a group of size ni = 11−µi with other people with identical needs for t
1
i and
t2i and if, in this group, the members contribute −t1i to a pot assigned randomly to one single
person. The size of the pot is then t2i =
µi
1−µi (−t1i ). This FA yields to i an expected utility
level of
Ui(L∗i ) =
ni − 1
ni
ui(yi + t1i ) +
1
ni
ui(yi −mi + (ni − 1)(−t1i )), (12)
located where g∗ crosses h in Figure 2. We now turn to the multi-period problem.
5 Multi-Period Model
This section extends previous results to the multi-periodic framework we first introduced in
Section 2. Before any transfer, the preferences of individual i at date 0 are thus simply
∞∑
t=1
δtvi(yi).
As before, any individual can design and sign binding financial agreements with the other
individuals. Negotiations take place only at date 0. Saving is not allowed.
Let us now compute the intertemporal utility of an individual i who belongs to a ni persons
rosca. First, when he joins the rosca, he does not know in which period he will have the pot.
Moreover, this individual knows that if he wins the pot in some period then he will be excluded
from the draw in the subsequent periods during a cycle. So, each cycle, he is sure to get the pot
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exactly once. There is thus a probability 1ni that he will have the pot at date h for each date
of the cycle. In this case, his payoff will be vi(yi+(ni− 1)(−t1i )) = ui(yi−mi+(ni− 1)(−t1i ))
in period h and ui(yi + t1i ) in the other periods t = 1, ..., ni, t 6= h. Hence, the intertemporal
utility at date 0 for the first cycle of any member i of the rosca is simply,
ni∑
h=1
1
ni
[
ni∑
t=1,t6=h
δtui(yi + t1i ) + δ
hui(yi −mi + (ni − 1)(−t1i ))]. (13)
This simplifies to
ni∑
t=1
δt[
ni − 1
ni
ui(yi + t1i ) +
1
ni
ui(yi −mi + (ni − 1)(−t1i ))]. (14)
Since, viewed from date 0, the expected outcome of all cycles are identical, the extension to
an infinity of periods is straightforward. The payoff at date 0 of any member of the rosca of
an infinity of periods is thus equal to
∞∑
t=1
δt{ni − 1
ni
u(yi + t1i ) +
1
ni
u(yi −mi + (ni − 1)(−t1i ))}. (15)
Observe now that this last expression is the exact multi-periodic extension of the static expres-
sion (12) obtained in the previous section. Hence, any individual may get the same expected
utility by forming a rosca as by playing efficient lotteries in each period. Nevertheless, this
does not mean that a rosca is an efficient lottery over the space of all possible lotteries. In-
deed, one needs to consider the space of all “dynamic lotteries”, not only the space of static
ones. Typically, a rosca is not a static lottery since the probability that an individual gets the
pot depends on previous draws. The next theorem, formally proved in Appendix C, extends
previous results for such dynamic lotteries.
Theorem A structure of financial agreement composed by random roscas is stable.
The above theorem establishes that roscas are stable financial contracts. The proof is
similar to that derived in the static framework. First, we show that Lemma 1 applies so that
individual i’s efficient lottery randomizes between only two transfers, t1i and t
2
i , at any date t.
Second, we show that any group of agent cannot improve their gain by deviating from a SFA
composed of roscas.
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So, why is a rosca efficient in our model? Intuitively, our explanation relies on the existence
of the self-control problem. We have represented an economy where an individual will be
tempted to purchase the superfluous good if he is rich enough. However, today he derives no
utility from this future purchase. Hence, a helpful financial agreement reduces this individual’s
future available income so that he will no longer be inclined to spend mi to purchase the good.
This may be done by paying a fixed contribution t committed in advance at regular dates.
However, this contribution t should not be a pure loss. As there are an infinite number of
contributors in the economy, people with the same contributions t pool together in a group.6
The sum of the contributions of the group is then collected and redistributed to only one
member. Thus, only this latter individual spends mi in order to purchase the superfluous
good. This explains why roscas are stable efficient agreements. A rosca minimizes the purchase
of superfluous goods in every period since they are bought by only one member during the
period he or she receives back the total of his own contributions.
6 Empirical Predictions
This theoretical result raises the question of whether there is some empirical support for our
model. Key parameters such as the non-pecuniary benefit Si are unobservable. Besides, our
main point was that people would want to find an ex ante device to escape future over-spending
in superfluous goods. It is difficult to have empirical support for this point since it requires
evidence of time-inconsistent preferences. A weak form of evidence relies on people’s declara-
tions in surveys (see the Introduction). Another form is related to the observed demands for
commitment techniques.7 But it is probably difficult to obtain strong direct empirical support
for our behavioral model. An indirect way is to derive and discuss theoretical implications.
This is the objective of this section.
To simplify, revert to Figure 2. Observe that any individual i with an income below y
i
or
6The assumption that there is an infinite number of people in the economy is thus not innocuous. If that were
not the case, the financial agreement would introduce a compromise to account for member’s heterogeneous
contributions. This may explain for instance the existence of roscas with variable contributions documented
by Henry et al. (1990) in Cameroon.
7A recent natural experiment (Ashraf et al., 2004) developed in the Philippines relates demands for com-
mitment savings products to hyperbolic discounting.
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above y¯i will not participate in a rosca. The idea is that poor individuals are not tempted
by superfluous goods and therefore have no interest in participating in a rosca. Conversely,
very rich individuals would have to pay a very high contribution in order to be poor enough
to be able to resist purchasing the superfluous good. As a result, it is too costly for them to
participate in a rosca.
Moreover, note that any individual i with initial income yi ∈ [yi, y¯i] increases his expected
utility if he participates in a rosca. To do so, he must form a rosca with people who have the
same needs for transfers, i.e., a rosca where the contribution is −t1i = yi − yi and where the
received transfer is t2i = y¯i − yi. The budget constraint implies that he will form a rosca with
ni persons where
ni =
t2i − t1i
−t1i
.
From these observations, we can easily derive three clear-cut predictions:
• #1 Average-income individuals are more likely to belong to a rosca compared to very
poor or very rich people;
• #2 Within roscas, members are homogeneous and, across roscas, the contribution in-
creases with the members’ income;
• #3 When the contribution is relatively larger, the size of the group is relatively lower.
Some empirical findings are fairly consistent with these predictions. First, Anderson et
al. (2002) interviewed people living in a poor slum in Kenya. They showed that roscas’
participants are more likely to have a higher income. Since this study concerned a very poor
population, it somehow gives support to prediction #1. Along the same line, Levenson and
Besley (1996) provide evidence that participation is higher among high-income households in
Taiwan.
Several studies seem to be fairly consistent with the first part of prediction #2 (i.e.,
homogeneity within roscas). In Uganda, rosca members reported that homogeneity in terms of
income level and gender is important for the success of a rosca (Wright and Mutesasira, 2001).
In Gambia, Nagarajan, Meyer and Graham (1999) who study a rosca called “osusu” indicate
that: “While three-fourths of the sampled osusus were composed of occupationally homogenous
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members, about two-thirds were composed of members homogenous in age or gender. About
half of the sampled osusus were simultaneously homogenous in gender, age and employment
type.” In Jamaica, Handa and Kirton (1999) found that there is high homogeneity among
roscas’ members.
Also Handa and Kirton indicate that there are two main broad categories of rosca in their
Jamaican panel. The first and most common type is a rosca with many members and with a
small contribution. The second and less frequent type of rosca has fewer and richer members,
meets at longer intervals and has a larger size of contribution. The latter findings are thus
consistent with our prediction #3, along with the second part of #2. The underlying economic
idea is that, all things being equal, individuals with low (large) incomes will need a low (large)
contribution to reduce their available income appropriately. They moreover need more (fewer)
contributing members in order to get the desired pot.
The above predictions are generally not unique to our behavioral model. For example,
prediction #1 could be generated in a durable good model a` la Besley, Coate and Loury
(1993). Wealthier people would have enough money to buy the durable good, and poorer
people would simply have no excess income to contribute to the rosca. Nevertheless, further
evidence supports the self-control hypothesis.
First, Aliber (2001) observes that types of occupation explain most of the differences
in the frequency of rosca meetings in his South African sample. He distinguishes between
daily, weekly and monthly roscas. Strikingly, all people working in the formal sector prefer
a monthly basis for meetings. He observes that monthly contributions also tend to coincide
with the end-of-the-month pay schedule. This can easily be explained in terms of a limited
self-control hypothesis. People who are paid on a monthly basis do not need to meet every
day or every week. In order to reduce their available monthly income, it is sufficient for them
to pay a contribution once a month to the other rosca members. Moreover, Aliber (2001)
observes that most rosca members (42%) prefer to be the last one to receive the pot rather
than the first (14%). Again, this last observation is not really consistent with the durable
good explanation.
Roscas seem to be very popular among bank employees. For instance, Bouman (1995)
reports that 75% of the Agricultural Bank staff in Egypt were members of a rosca. Similarly,
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Adams and Canavesi de Sahonero (1978) find surprising that in Bolivia roscas “were common
among employees of most formal financial intermediaries: Commercial banks, development
banks, the Central Banks, and the apex organization of the credit unions”. They conclude
that “this raises interesting questions about the benefits employees realize from participating
in pasanakus [i.e. the local rosca] that they cannot realize from the financial institution in
which they work.” It is not easy to relate these observations to the durable good hypothesis.
Bank employees have a better access to credit than most people living in developing countries.
They should therefore be less likely to rely on roscas to finance a durable good. However, there
are some reasons why bank employees may want to make their savings less easily accessible in
the future. First, they may also be tempted by superfluous goods. A rosca is then an efficient
way to sometime alleviate this temptation if they are wealthy enough (but not too wealthy).
Second, due to their occupation, bank employees may face substantial social pressure to share
their income. Hence belonging to a rosca may help them to turn down requests from peers
or relatives more easily. This explanation thus relies on our hypothesis that some self-control
problems may be linked to a phenomenon of social pressure.
Similarly, Anderson et al. (2002) note that people who have permanent positions and who
have lived longer in the slum under study are more likely to participate in roscas. Again,
people who have a relatively more stable occupation and a more stable place to live are more
likely to be pressed to share their income. They may therefore want to find a device enabling
them to resist to this social pressure. As a result, they may be more likely to participate in
roscas.
We conclude this section on empirical predictions with two brief remarks about our model.
First, in usual roscas, winners are excluded from the pot in the subsequent periods. Why is
this the case? Without excluding winners, ex post inequality will be higher. Some individuals
may receive the pot several times while other individuals may not receive it at all. Roscas thus
minimize the wealth inequality of each draw. This is a good fairness property but it was not
captured in our expected utility framework. The second remark is related to the interpretation
of our behavioral model as a model of social pressure. We have inferred that roscas may help
people to limit their expenditures in social redistributive obligations. This interpretation,
however, raises further externality and reciprocity issues that our model has not addressed.
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For instance, since forming roscas reduces the frequency of income sharing, i.e., mi is spent
less often, one can expect that the amount transferred to the poor mi increases. The amount
to be shared mi, as well as the reason why it is shared, should be somehow endogenous. Both
remarks probably deserve some attention in future research.
7 Conclusion
Understanding the rationale underlying informal institutions in developing countries is one
of the main challenges of development economics. Among these informal institutions, roscas
are one of the most common but also one of the most puzzling. Since the paper by Besley,
Coate and Loury (1993), the economic literature has been mostly driven by the durable good
hypothesis. This literature asserts that the main benefit of roscas is to allow an early purchase
of a durable good.
Empirical studies have suggested that self-control problems may be another motive to join
roscas. For instance, Bouman (1995) asserts (page 375) that “Roscas also have illiquidity
function. People with cash on their hands and afraid of greedy relatives, will purposely join
a rosca to become illiquid. Contributions to a rosca are recognized by society as obligatory,
and constitute a senior claim that must be respected by others.” In his 1977 article, page 194,
Bouman adds “By shedding liquidity through circulation in a rosca, one is (temporarily) safe
from demands of support from the extended family.” In a survey in South Africa (Aliber,
2001), rosca members mention self-control problems as the main motive for joining a rosca
(see also Gugerty, 2000, for further evidence).
We have formalized this idea that roscas may be viewed as a commitment device which
helps people to cope with their own self-control problems. We have introduced a model
whereby people want to avoid spending too much money in the future purchase of a “super-
fluous” good. One way to avoid this future purchase is to commit in advance to contribute
a fixed and inflexible amount at regular dates. This commitment device simply enables par-
ticipants to decrease the available income that can be devoted to this purchase. Moreover,
it is not difficult to understand that an optimal device is such that people can recover their
contributions at some points in time, but not too often, because the extra-cash would tempt
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them to the purchase superfluous good too often. Hence, the best financial agreement requires
a commitment on fixed contributions paid in advance many times and a high remuneration
received at a single point in time. For stability purposes, the date of the remuneration must
be randomized to assign same ex ante expected utility to every member. This is a typical
random rosca.
An important point of our paper is the efficiency result we have obtained. Besley, Coate
and Loury (1994) showed that a random rosca is sometimes better than organizing a credit
market. But they agree that roscas are in general inefficient, implying that people can be
better-off designing a Pareto-superior financial agreement. Instead, in our simple behavioral
model, roscas turn out to be efficient, even in the absence of any motive for savings.
We should add that the durable good and the self-control hypotheses do not have to be
mutually exclusive but may well complement each other. Think of the attitude of a rosca
member when he has just received the pot. If he faces severe self-control problems, he may
be tempted to splurge all this money on superfluous goods. This may explain why rosca
members sometime commit in advance to buy an observable lumpy durable good with the
pot. This commitment is often part of the deal. Rosca members might go so far as to monitor
or supervise the purchases of the person receiving the pot, or to purchase it in kind for that
person rather than giving him the cash (Gugerty, 2000).
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A Proof of Lemma 1
Consider an efficient lottery L∗i = (K∗, p∗, T ∗i ) for a given cost xi. Let us partition any arbitrary set of transfers
Ti = {tli} into two subsets Ti− = {tli ∈ Ti|tli ≤ t1i } and Ti+ = {tli ∈ Ti|tli > t1i }. The proof proceeds in four
steps. First, we show that i’s utility is higher when receiving a positive transfer. Second, we prove that if an
agent has to give (i.e. t1i < 0), then he would give at most t
1
i . Third, we establish that, due to consumption
smoothing, all transfers lower than t1i must be the same, equal to t
1
i . Lastly, we derive the first order condition
defining t2i .
Step 1: ui(yi + t
k∗
i ) < ui(yi −mi + tl∗i ) for every tk∗i ∈ T ∗i− and tl∗i ∈ T ∗i+.
Suppose that ui(yi + t
k∗
i ) ≥ ui(yi −mi + tl∗i ). Then suppose that, in state l, instead of assigning tl∗i , the
lottery assigns tl∗i + ² with probability q and t
k∗
i with probability 1 − q, where q(tl∗i + ²) + (1 − q)tk∗i = tl∗i .
For a q sufficiently small (but positive) and ² high enough, ui(yi −mi + tl∗i + ²) > ui(yi + tk∗i ). This lottery
dominates L∗i while having same expected payoff, which in turn, implies that L∗i cannot be optimal.
Step 2: If tl∗i ∈ T ∗i− then tl∗i = t1i .
Suppose that this is not true. Suppose that there exists tl∗i < t
1
i . Consider any arbitrary t
k∗
i ∈ T ∗i+ (Recall
that efficiency implies that T ∗i+ is no empty). Then there exists ² > 0 and ²
′ > 0 sufficiently small such that
tk∗i − ²′ ∈ T ∗i+ and tl∗i + ² ∈ T ∗i− and p(l)² + p(k)²′ = 0. The lottery L′i = (K∗, p∗, T ′i ) with t′l = tl∗i + ²,
t′k = t
k∗
i − ²′, and t′h = t∗h for every h 6= l, k is assigns same expected payoff xi than L∗i . We show that L′i
dominates Li∗. Note that ui strictly concave implies
ui(yi + t
l∗
i + ²)− ui(yi + tl∗i ) > u′i(yi + tl∗i + ²)²,
and,
ui(yi −mi + tk∗i )− ui(yi −mi + tk∗i − ²′) < u′i(yi −mi + tk∗i − ²′)²′.
Moreover,
Ui(L′)− Ui(L∗i ) = p(l){ui(yi + tl∗i + ²)− ui(yi + tl∗i )}+ p(k){ui(yi −mi + tk∗i − ²′)− ui(yi −mi + tk∗i )}.
The last three equations imply:
Ui(L′i)− Ui(L∗i ) > p(l)u′i(yi + tl∗i + ²)²− p(k)u′i(yi −mi + tk∗i − ²′)²′. (16)
We know since Step 1 that tk∗i − ²′ ∈ T ∗i+ and tl∗i + ² ∈ T ∗i− imply ui(yi+ tl∗i + ²) < u(yi−mi+ tk∗i − ²′), which,
in turn implies u′i(yi + t
l∗
i + ²) < u
′(yi −mi + tk∗i − ²′). Moreover, by assumption p(k)² = −p(l)²′. Therefore
the left-hand side of (16) is positive, which contradicts that L∗i is efficient.
Step 3: If tl∗i ∈ T ∗i+ and tk∗i ∈ T ∗i+, then tl∗i = tk∗i ≡ t2i .
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Suppose this is not true. Suppose that there exists tl∗i ∈ T ∗i+ and tk∗i ∈ T ∗i+ such that tl∗i 6= tk∗i . Then L∗i
is dominated by the (same expected payoff) L′ = (K∗, p∗, T ′i ) defined by tk′i = tl′i = p(k)tk∗i + p(l)tl∗i , th′i = th∗i
for every h 6= k, l.
Step 4: Condition defining t2i .
Let µ (1−µ) be the probability that i transfers t1i (t2i ). By definition, µ and t2i solves maxµ,t µui(yi+ t1i )+
(1 − µ)ui(yi −mi + t) subject to µt1i + (1 − µ)t = xi. Substituting for µ as defined by the constraint in the
objective function and differentiating with respect to t yields (7) as a first order condition.
B Proof of Lemma 2
First, we show that any SFAC∗ including non-fair lotteries is not stable. Consider the FA C∗j = (N
∗
j , {L∗i }i∈Nj ) ∈
C∗ randomizing between transfers t1i and t
2
i . Suppose that xf > 0 for one agent f ∈ Nj . Equation (9) implies
that xe < 0 for at least another agent e ∈ Nj . Pick up any agent h of another FA, Ck ∈ C∗, randomizing
between same transfers t1i and t
2
i in a lottery of cost xh ≤ 0. Design a new FA, C′j = (S, {L′i}i∈S) similar to
C∗j , except that: 1) f is replaced by h in the group S; 2) in one state of nature l in which f was previously
assigned t2i , while e receives t
1
i , define two state of nature l1 and l2. In l1, e gets t
1
i while h gets t
2
i . Reversely, in
l2, h is assigned t
1
i while e gets t
2
i . Choose the probabilities of states l1 and l2 such that h gives less often with
this FA, C′j , than with the former FA he belonged to C
∗. This translates to µ′h < µ
∗
h, where µ
′
h (µ
∗
h) denotes
h’s probability to be assigned t1i in C
′
j (C
∗
j ). Therefore Uh(L′h) > Uh(L∗h). With C′j , e is assigned t1i less often
(and gets t2i more often) than in C
∗
j , meaning that µ
′
e < µ
∗
e and, therefore Ue(L′e) > Ue(L∗e). Nothing changes
for every other members i 6= h of C′j (i.e. they commit to same transfers in states l1 and l2 than in the former
state l) who therefore gets the same expected payoff Ui(L′i) = Ui(L∗i ). Hence, we have established that C∗ is
not stable according to Definition 3.
Second, we prove that a SFA with only fair lotteries is stable. Consider C∗ where every FA C∗j =
(N∗j , {L∗k}k∈Nj ) ∈ C∗ includes people with same needs to randomize between transfers t1i and t2i (e.g. same
utility function and revenue) who indeed randomize among these transfers with fair lotteries and corresponding
probabilities denoted µi and 1− µi. Suppose that there exists C′j = (S, {L′k}k∈S); such that Uk(L′k) ≥ Uk(L∗k)
for every k ∈ S and Uh(L′h) > Uh(L∗h) for at least one h ∈ S. Obviously C′j includes efficient lotteries L′k
randomizing between t1i and t
2
i . Denote the corresponding probabilities µ
′
k and 1−µ′k. Since Uk(L′k) ≥ Uk(L∗k)
implies µ′k ≤ µi for every k ∈ S, and Uh(L′h) > Uh(L∗h) implies µ′h < µi, then∑
k∈S
{µ′k(t1i ) + (1− µ′k)t2i } >
∑
k∈S
{µi(t1i ) + (1− µi)t2i }. (17)
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Since lotteries L∗i are fair, the right-hand side of (17) equals zero and, therefore,
∑
k∈S{µ′kt1i +(1−µ′k)t2i } > 0.
Thus, C′j does not satisfy (9), which contradicts that C
′
j is a FA.
C Proof of the Theorem
The proof is organized in three steps. Step 1 extends the definition of a FA to a multi-period framework. Step
2 confirms that Lemma 1 still applies within the multi-period framework. Finally, step 3 shows that a SFA
composed by roscas is stable.
Step 1 Extension of the definition of a FA to a multi-period framework.
A multi-period FA, Cj = (Nj , {Li}i∈Nj ) is still defined by a group of agents Nj . But now, each member
faces a sequence of per-period lotteries. For simplicity, it is still denoted Li. Each per-period lottery part of
this sequence might depend on previous draws. Without loss of generality, all these lotteries can be defined on
a common set of states of nature Kjt. However, the probability measure on Kjt might be contingent on the
previous realized states of nature.
Since the contracting choices occur only at date 0 the choices are guided by probabilities computed at
date 0. Formally, denoting pjt the probability at date 0 that state l ∈ Kit is drawn at date t, the discounted
expected utility of an arbitrary member i of the FA Cj = (Nj , {Li}i∈Nj ) is:
Ui(Li) =
∞∑
t=1
δt
∑
l∈Kjt
pjt(l)vi(yi + t
l
i), (18)
Step 2 Lemma 1 still applies within the multi-period framework.
Any efficient sequence of lotteries Li still maximizes (18) subject to a sequence of per-period expected
payoffs {xit}t∈N (viewed at date 0) defined by xit =∑l∈Kjt pjt(l)tlit. Clearly, it is equivalent to maximizing per-
period expected utility (viewed at date 0), namely
∑
l∈Kjt pjt(l)vi(yi + t
l
i), subject to the per-period expected
payoffs xit for every date t. Hence Lemma 1 applies.
Step 3 A SFA composed by roscas is stable.
Suppose that SFA composed by roscas is not stable. Then there exists a FA, C′j = (S, {L′i}i∈S) such that
every member i ∈ S is not worse off and at least one member h ∈ S is strictly better off than with a SFA with
only roscas. Then C′j include efficient lotteries, so that i’s (discounted) expected utility simplifies to:
Ui(Li) =
∞∑
t=1
δt{µ′itui(yi + t1i ) + (1− µ′it)ui(yi −mi + t2i )}, (19)
where µ′it (1 − µ′it) denotes the probability at date 0 that i is assigned t1i (t2i ) at date t. On the other hand,
(15) tells us that, to a member i, a rosca yields a (discounted) expected utility:
Ui(L∗i ) =
∞∑
t=1
δt{µiui(yi + t1i ) + (1− µi)ui(yi −mi + t2i )}, (20)
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where µi =
ni − 1
ni (Recall that ni denotes the optimal size of the rosca for individual i).
Now, by assumption, Ui(L′i) ≥ Ui(L∗i ) for every i ∈ S and Uh(L′h) > Uh(L∗h) for at least one h ∈ S.
Combining the above two inequalities with (19) and (20) implies
∑∞
t=1 δ
tµ′it ≤
∑∞
t=1 δ
tµi and
∑∞
t=1 δ
t(1−µ′it) ≥∑∞
t=1 δ
t(1− µi); with a strict inequality for at least one individual h ∈ S. These inequalities in turn imply:
∑
i∈S
∞∑
t=1
δt{µ′itt1i + (1− µ′it)t2i } >
∑
i∈S
∞∑
t=1
δt{µit1i + (1− µi)t2i }.
In other words,
∑
i∈S
∑∞
t=1 δ
tx′it >
∑
i∈S
∑∞
t=1 δ
tx∗it, where x
′
it and x
∗
it are the respective expected payoffs
(viewed from date 0) of the per-period lotteries played at date t. Since they sum-up to 0 for roscas, i.e.
x∗it = 0 for every t, at least one per-period lottery expected payoff x
′
it is strictly positive while the others are
non-negative, which contradicts the supposition that C′j is a FA.
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